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CASENOTES
INSURANCE-LIMITED LIABILITY POLICIES-
INSURER'S LIABILTY FOR EXCESS JUDGMENTS
RESULTING FROM BAD FAITH
Insured, covered by a limited liability policy, negligently injured
another. The insurance company refused to accept an offer to settle
for less than the amount of the policy and declined to negotiate a settlement.
The insured was sued and a judgment was rendered against him in excess
of the coverage of the policy. Insured now brings action to recover this
excess amount from the insuring company. Held, the attitude of the
insurer in refusing to settle or negotiate was arbitrary and in bad faith;
the insurer could not rightly assume the insured's right to settle and
then not exercise that right in a fair and intelligent manner. Tully v.
Travelers Insurance Company, 118 F. Supp. 568, (N.D. Fla. 1954).
It is a well established principle that, when an insurance company
reserves the right to settle and/or defend all claims, the insurer also assumes
a duty to the insured.' This type of reservation is pernitted and
necessary to prevent the injured party and the insured from colluding to
defraud the insurance company. However, when this right is assumed,
the insurer is obligated to consider the interests of the insured as (at
least) equal to its own interests. 2  Whether these duties are found on
the basis of a fiduciary3 or a contractual' relationship, they are enforced
by the same standards.5
According to the reservations of the policy, the insurer may elect
to settle or defend the claim.0 H-owever, although this right appears to
be absolute, it is agreed that the conduct of the insurer may be of such
a nature as to make him liable for amounts in excess of the limitations
1. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Cook-O'Brien Construction Co., 69 F.2d 462
8th Cir. 1934); Auto Mutual Indemnity Co. v. Shaw, 134 Fla. 815, 184 So. 852
1938); Hilker v. Western Automobile Insurance Co., 204 Wis. 1, 231 N.W. 257
1930)
2. Ballard v. Citizens Casualty Co. of New York, 196 F.2d 96 (7th Cir. 1952);
Douglas v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 81 N.H. 371, 127 Atl, 708
(1924); National Mutual Casualty Co. v. Britt, 200 P.2d 407 (Okla. 1948).
American Fidelity and Casualty Co. v. C. A. Nichols Co., 173 F.2d 830
(10th Cir. 1949); Douglas v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 81 N.H. 371,
127 AtI. 708 (1924); Johnson v. Hardware Mutual Casualty Co., 109 Vt. 481, 1
A.2d 817 (1938); Hilker v. Western Automobile Insurance Co., 204 Wis. 1, 231 N.W.
257 (1930).
4. Attleboro Manufacturing Co. v. Frankfort Marine Insurance Co., 240 Fed.
573 (1st Cir. 1917); Foremost Dairies v. Campbell Coal Co., 57 Ga. App. 500, 196
S.E. 279 (1938).
5. Hilker v. Western Automobile Insurance Co., 204 Wis. 1, 231 N.W. 257
(1930).
6. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Cook-O'Brien Construction Co., 69 F.2d 462 (8th
Cir. 1934); Best Building Co. v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp., 247 N.Y. 451,
160 N.E. 911 (1928); Johnson v. Hardware Mutual Casualty Co., 109 Vt. 481,
1 A.2d 817 (1938).
MIAMI LAW QUAR'ERLY
prescribed on the face of the policy r There is a split of authority as to
when failure or refusal to settle by the insurer (resulting in such excesses)
will make it liable for these amounts. Most jurisdictions will not find
liability when the refusal and the surplus werc the result of an honest
mistake or error in judgment;8 nor will the insurer be held liable when
it is found that the refusal was based on a bona fidc belief that there
was a chance to defeat the action? 'To find the insurer liable, a majority
of the courts require that the insured show "bad faith" on the part of
the insurer; 0 however, a minority of jurisdictions mcrely require evidence
of "negligence."''
The terms "negligence" and "bad faith" are defincd and applied in
their usual manner. It has been hWl to be good faith wherc the insurer's
decision to refuse to settle was based on an honest and intelligent con-
sidration of all the facts, taking into account the nature and extent of
the injury.' 2 Bad faith was broadly considered as a state of mind, each
instance of which must be proven according to specific evidence and
decided by the jury.1 Failure to settle within the limits of the policy
when honest discretion and judgment indicated that such a settlement
would be less than that of a judgment, was held to constitute bad
faith; 4 refusal to settle when such refusal was maintained against the
advice of counsel and adjuster was also held to imply bad faith.' 5
As in previous attempts to define negligence in other fields, the
"reasonable and prudent inan" test is used.'6  This line of decisions leaves
to the jury to decide whether or not the insurer acted in a manner befitting
7. Ballard v. Citizens Casualty Co. of New York, 196 F.2d 96 (7th Cir. 1952);
National Mutual Casualty Co. v. Britt, 200 P.2d 407 (Okla. 1948).
8. E.g., Ballard v. Citizens Casualty Co. of New York, 196 F.2d 96 (7th Cir.
1952); Lawson & Nelson Sash & Door Company v. Associated Indemnity Corp., 204
Minn. 50, 282 N.W. 481 (1938); Burnham v. Commercial Casualty Insurance Co.,
10 Wash.2d 624, 117 P.2d 644 (1941).
9. New Orleans & Carrolton R.R., v. Maryland Casualty Insurance Co., 114 La.
153, 38 So. 89 (1905); City of Wakefield v. Globe Indemnity Co., 246 Mich. 645,
225 N.W. 643 (1929).
10. E.g., Maryland Casualty Co. v. Cook-O'Brien Construction Co., 69 F.2d
462 (8th Cir. 1934); Auto Mutual Indemnity Co. v. Shaw, 134 Fla. 815, 184 So. 852
(1938); Mendota Electric Co. v. New York Indemnity Co., 169 Minn. 377, 211 N.W.
317 (1926); Best Building Co. v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp., 247 N.Y. 451,
160 N.E. 911 (1928); Johnson v. Hardware Mutual Casualty Co., 109 Vt. 481,
1 A.2d 817 (1938); Hilker v. Western Automobile Insurance Co., 204 Wis. 1, 231
N. W. 257 (1930).
11. E.g., Attleboro Manufacturing Co. v. Frankfort Marine Insurance Co., 240
Fed. 573 (1st Cir. 1917); Douglas v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 81
N.H. 371, 127 Atl. 708 (19241); Tyger River Pine Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 170
S.C. 286, 170 S.E. 346 (1933); G. A. Stowers Furniture Co. v. American Indemnity
Co., 15 S.W.2d 544 (Tex. 1929).
12. E.g., llilker v. Western Automobile Insurance Co., 204 Wis. 1, 231 N.W.
257 (1930).
13. Johnson v. Hardware Mutual Casualty Co., 109 Vt. 481, 1 A.2d 817 (1938).
14. Traders and General Insurance Co. v. Rudco Oil and Gas Co., 129 F.2d 621
(10th Cir. 1942).
15. See note 13 supra.
16. See note 11 supra.
CASENOTES
a reasonable and prudent man. 17  It is difficult to draw any conclusions
from this line of decisions other than to note that the layman's rulings
have been prone to be adverse to the interests of the insurance companies.
The court (in this case of first impression), in holding the insurance
company liable in the instant case, (by requiring evidence of bad faith)
has adopted the majority rule. In Auto Mutual Indemnity Co. v. Shaw,"8
the Florida Supreme Court announced that, although there was
insufficient evidence to hold the insurer liable, the court would follow
the "bad faith" rule. In the instant case, the insurance company flatly
refused to negotiate or compromise; such arbitrary refusal has been held
to constitute bad faith per se"9 and it was so held here.
It is submitted that Florida, by selccting and subscribing to the
majority view, has chosen the fairer and more equitable of the two
theories. This rule does hold the insurer liable for serious breach of faith
but does not make this liability dependent upon mere negligence as
decided by the nebulous and often emotional "reasonable man" test.
Richard I. Parker
REAL PROPERTY-EASEMENTS-ORAL-
FRAUD ACTIONS
The plaintiff purchased land from the defendant, who orally agreed
to develop bathing beach facilities and give an easement for use thereof.
When the vendor refused to perform, the plaintiff brought action in fraud
and deceit, which was dismissed by trial court. Held, on appeal, affirmed.
Agreements creating easements are within the Statute of Frauds and are
unenforceable directly or indirectly, unless in writing. Canell v. Arcola
Housing Corp., 65 So.2d 849 (Fla. 1953).
Most courts bold that if at the time of making a promise to do
future acts, no intention to perform existed, an action for fraud and deceit
will lie." A minority of jurisdictions maintain that whether or not
performance was intended, future promises are not a basis for fraud.2
17. Ibid.
18. 134 Fla. 815, 184 So. 852 (1938).
19. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Elmira Coal Co., 69 F.2d 616 (8th Cir. 1934);
Douglas v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 81 N.H. 371, 127 Ati. 708
(1924); Hilker v. Western Automobile Insurance Co.. 204 Wis. 1, 231 N.W. 257 (1930).
1. O'Melia v. Adkins, 73 Cal. App.2d 143, 166 P.2d 298 (1946); Day v.
Weadock, 101 Fla. 333, 134 So. 525 (1931); Feldman v. Witmark, 254 Mass. 480,
150 N.E. 329 (1926); Rutan v. Straehly, 289 Mich. 341, 286 N.V. 639 (1939);
Brittingham v. Huylers, 120 N.J. Eq. 198, 184 Ad. 529 (Ct. Err. & App. 1936);
Zora Realty Co. v. Green, 186 Misc. 1044, 60 N.Y.S.2d 440 (Sup. Ct. 1946); Harris
v. Sanderson, 178 S.W.2d 315 (Texas 1944); Kritzer v. Moffat, 136 Wash. 410, 240
Pac. 355 (1925); Davis v. Alford, 113 W.Va. 30, 166 S.E. 701 (1932).
2. Sachs v. Blewett, 206 Ind. 151, 185 N.E. 856 (1933). Jeck v. O'Meara, 341
Mo. 419, 107 S.W.2d 782 (1937); Woods v. Scott. 107 Vt. 249, 178 At]. 886 (1935).
